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Abstract
Public hospitals are well known to be difficult to reform. This paper provides a comprehensive six-part analytic
framework that can help policymakers and managers better shape their organizational and institutional behavior.
The paper first describes three separate structural characteristics which, together, inhibit effective problem
description and policy design for public hospitals. These three structural constraints are i) the dysfunctional
characteristics found in most organizations, ii) the particular dysfunctions of professional health sector organizations,
and iii) the additional dysfunctional dimensions of politically managed organizations. While the problems in each of
these three dimensions of public hospital organization are well-known, and the first two dimensions clearly affect
private as well as publicly run hospitals, insufficient attention has been paid to the combined impact of all three
factors in making public hospitals particularly difficult to manage and steer.
Further, these three structural dimensions interact in an institutional environment defined by three restrictive
context limitations, again two of which also affect private hospitals but all three of which compound the
management dilemmas in public hospitals. The first contextual limitation is the inherent complexity of delivering
high quality, safe, and affordable modern inpatient care in a hospital setting. The second contextual limitation is a
set of specific market failures in public hospitals, which limit the scope of the standard financial incentives and
reform measures. The third and last contextual limitation is the unique problem of generalized and localized
anxiety, which accompanies the delivery of medical services, and which suffuses decision-making on the part of
patients, medical staff, hospital management, and political actors alike.
This combination of six institutional characteristics – three structural dimensions and three contextual
dimensions – can help explain why public hospitals are different in character from other parts of the
public sector, and the scale of the challenge they present to political decision-makers.




Hospitals are hard organizations to change. Publicly
owned and operated hospitals even more so. In many
countries, both managers and staff anticipate, despite
constant calls for improvements in efficiency, quality,
and responsiveness, that little will be different tomorrow
or next year. Similarly, politicians, seeking to outflank
these intra-institutional expectations, have learned to
introduce major reforms early in their term to maximize
what leverage they have over public hospital managers
and staff.
This creates a narrow window for organizational
change in public hospitals which, combined with the
standard political hazards [1], still has only a relatively
low probability of success, and thus further reinforces
the view of hospital management and staff that ‘this too
shall pass’.
Conversely, while public hospitals remain broadly
insulated from major policy-driven change, there con-
tinues to be rapid successful change in the practice of
medicine. This can be seen in clinical treatments,
diagnostic technology, in reduced lengths of stay and
increased ambulatory treatment, all in spite of a shift to
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patients being older, more complex and with increasing
amounts of chronic disease.
Taken together, these conflicting trends result in most
public hospital change being technical and functional
rather than organizational and institutional. Even as clin-
ical responses change relatively rapidly, departmental
and institutional routines remain broadly insulated,
ensuring organizational stability for many regular daily
activities. This can be an important positive from the
perspective of hospital staff, and, sometimes, patients,
but not always for the latter if it means long waits in a
traditional outpatient department or the other tedious
things that patients have to do to accommodate
ingrained hospital routines. In routine operating aspects,
stability also can mean organizational stasis and inertia
regarding clinical issues as well as larger policy and
management objectives – an important negative from
the perspective of health sector reform [2].
This intricate pattern of public hospitals’ internal
resilience and external resistance can be observed in a
variety of countries and in a range of different financial
and institutional circumstances. Among the most visible
examples have been the mixed success achieved over the
past 20 years to eliminate unacceptably long waiting
times for elective procedures in English and Swedish
hospitals [3, 4]. Further examples can be observed in the
slow pace of organizational and institutional change in
public hospitals following major reform in the English
NHS [5] and resistance to structural change in the
Norwegian [6] health systems; the unsteady development
of hospital level semi-autonomy in some newly built
hospitals in some Spanish provinces [7], and the complexity
of introducing elements of institutional self-management in
Estonia [8]. Examples of similar reactions to efforts to intro-
duce major organizational change can be found in Portugal
[9] as well as in Israel [10].
Academics have proposed a range of theories to
explain and/or mitigate this common public hospital
behavior. In the early 1990s, there was discussion among
political scientists about path dependency as the source
of institutional obduracy [11, 12] as well as the potential
value of “big bang” as against “incrementalist” ap-
proaches to generate change [13]. The early 1990s also
saw the rise of New Public Management theory, calling
for private-sector-derived managerial strategies such as
contracting out services [14] and “steering not rowing”
in the organization of public sector service provision
[15]. Public Administration theorists explored why con-
tracting in public sector institutions, once introduced,
was difficult to manage effectively [16]. More recently,
ideas from complexity theory have been invoked [17],
although these perhaps have more utility in explaining
why organizational change is so difficult than they do in
identifying strategies that might achieve it.
Inside the health care sector, a variety of fiscal and
regulatory solutions have been put forward to try to
address this conundrum. Paying hospitals according to
Diagnostic-Related Groups (DRGs) changed the financial
incentives for hospital managers [18], and, in some cases,
clinicians. Attempts were made to increase the power
of these incentives by adding pay-for-performance to
DRGs to target hospital staff behavior more effectively
[18, 19] so as to reflect different value streams within
healthcare [20].
Throughout this period, turning away from public
sector control by creating semi-autonomous public
hospital management [21], private sector contract man-
agement for public hospitals [15, 22], privately built and
managed but publicly paid new public hospitals [23, 24],
and also full privatization of existing public hospitals
[25, 26] have all been suggested and, in a number of
countries in different circumstances and with a wide
range of limitations, introduced. Simultaneously, in
tax-funded health systems like England, a panoply of
new regulatory bodies were established (National In-
stitute for Clinical Excellence (NICE); Commission
on Health Improvement (CHI); Monitor; Care Qual-
ity Commission; etc.) to try to rein in poor quality
and/or inefficient managerial practices in individual
institutions.
All of these measures have had at least some effect on
hospital behavior and institutional outcomes [27, 28].
This has been generally positive but the effect has often
been less powerful than expected and not necessarily
what was intended [29]. However, most evoked reaction
from the forces of institutional status quo, and nearly all
have had a relatively short half-life in generating effective
organizational change [30].
This complex response from public hospitals is not
always inappropriate or misguided [31]. Many of the
characteristics of successful organizations and profes-
sional and managerial practice can easily tip over into
behaviors that thwart change. This poses questions
which are a core governance issue for both policy and
management in public hospitals: when does the positive
and necessary need for day-to-day organizational sta-
bility decay into a negative and obstructive form of
organizational stasis?
a) Where is the boundary between organizational
resilience and organizational resistance?
b) When do appropriate professional interests and
caution evolve into inappropriate resistance
to change?
c) When does organizational or professional culture
cross the line into territorialism?
d) When does the hospital’s concern about income
stability become protectionism?
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e) When does top-down regulation become unhelpful
interference in essential managerial prerogatives?
Who makes these decisions, and what type of response
is possible? In privately owned hospitals, responsibility
rests with senior management, and their jobs may well
depend on how rapidly and effectively they respond. But
how does this major institutional process play out in
public hospitals?
This paper’s approach
This article sets out a framework for conceptualizing
why public sector hospitals are so hard to successfully
change and suggests a pathway toward better strategies
to address these issues. It makes two tightly intertwined
arguments.
The article’s first contention is that, to date, there has
often been poor specification of the problem. In particu-
lar, the traditional metaphors or analytic frameworks
used to steer decision-making for public hospitals con-
tinue to be conceptually limited and insufficient for
thinking about the problems they are supposed to frame.
The second argument examines the core structural
problems that public hospitals present. The paper con-
tends that there are three separate structural characteris-
tics which, together, inhibit effective problem description
and policy design for public hospitals. These three struc-
tural constraints are i) the dysfunctional characteristics
found in most organizations, ii) the particular dysfunc-
tions of professional health sector organizations, and iii)
the additional dysfunctional dimensions of politically
managed organizations.
While the problems in each of these three dimensions
of public hospital organization are well-known, and the
first two dimensions clearly affect private as well as
publicly run hospitals, insufficient attention has been
paid to the combined impact of all three factors in
making public hospitals particularly difficult to man-
age and steer.
Further, these three structural dimensions come to-
gether in an institutional environment shaped by a set of
three external contextual factors that further constrain
effective management and reform of public hospitals.
The first contextual limitation is the inherent and in-
creasing complexity of delivering high quality, safe, and
affordable modern inpatient care in a hospital setting
and across organizational boundaries [32].
The second contextual limitation is a set of specific
market failures in public hospitals, which limit the scope
of the standard financial incentives and reform mea-
sures. These mechanisms are also often in conflict with
the role of professional medical authority (which has
been already discussed above as the second structural
limitation in hospitals).
The third and last contextual limitation is the unique
problem of generalized and localized anxiety, which
accompanies the delivery of medical services, and
which suffuses decision-making on the part of patients,
medical staff, hospital management, and political actors
alike.
Thus the paper’s second argument is that this combin-
ation of six institutional characteristics – three structural
dimensions and three contextual dimensions – helps
explain why hospitals generally, and public hospitals in
particular, are different in character from other areas in
the public sector, and the difference in the demands they
place on political decision-makers. It also suggests the
importance – indeed the primacy – of sophisticated
organizational level management as the key building
block of effective public hospital behavior, and the con-
sequent importance of correctly aligning policy to facili-
tate that core central objective.
The central argument of this paper can be summa-
rized, then, as follows. First, existing standalone analytic
frameworks inadequately describe the policy and man-
agement quandary that public hospitals present. Second,
the three plus three analysis delineated above provides a
better (but probably still incomplete) framework for
understanding and re-directing public hospital decision-
making and outcomes. The sections that follow below
explore these ideas in more detail.
Main text
Partial and inadequate analytic frameworks
A central issue in the reform of hospital systems is a
poor specification of the problem and consequently of
the methods set forward for dealing with that problem.
One reason for this difficulty seems to be the complexity
of these systems, which makes the identification of root
causes difficult and creates many feedback systems
which render the outcomes of policy interventions un-
predictable. An understandable approach to complexity
is to look for ways of simplifying it and in these circum-
stances solutions based on a particular narrative, ideo-
logical position or method look very attractive. The
difficulty is how to make the problems manageable while
not losing core elements of the complex reality, which
are essential for appropriate diagnosis and solution.
Firstly, there are issues about the understanding of the
system that is being reformed [23]. There is often a
focus on hospitals which confuses institutions or build-
ings with the actual operating and business models that
underpin them, and which fails to grasp the interconnec-
tions between the component parts of hospitals and the
wider health system.
Secondly, there is the conceptual lens through which
problems are defined. There are several in use and some
are used together:
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 Economics and markets: The problem of poor
performance is due to the absence of appropriate
financial incentives and the effective operation of
market mechanisms such as competition, the threat
of bankruptcy and new entrants at the individual
and institutional level.
 Business models: Michael Porter argues that health
care has the wrong sort of competition [33].
Similarly, Clayton Christensen argues that current
business and operating models do not fit the nature
of the work to be done [34].
 Theory X Management: The problem is seen to be
the result of a lack of firm managerial grip and
control. This leads to the use of performance
management measures with heavy emphasis on
sanctions for poor performance. Finance ministries
often seem to be attached to this model [35].
 New Public Management: Measures to contract out
clinical and non-clinical services to both public and
private providers, combined with public-private-
partnerships to build new facilities, will generate better
performance [14]. Patient choice of public or private
providers, with money following patients, will reinforce
pressure for higher quality outcomes [36, 37].
 Complex Adaptive Systems: Health care should be
seen as non-linear and dynamic, composed of
independent agents with conflicting goals and
intelligent adaptive behavior, resulting in self-
organization [38, 39]. This model is more
comprehensive, but is less helpful as a guide
to specific policy or management action.
Moreover, all of these analytic frameworks may have
different (usually implicit) assumptions about the na-
ture of human behavior and motivation. For example,
readings of how far policymakers view staff and man-
agers as ‘knights’ or ‘knaves,’ to use Le Grand’s typ-
ology [40]. In other words, the extent to which it is
possible to rely on intrinsic motivation, professional-
ism and good intentions (‘knightly’ behaviors) rather
than having to use a variety of incentives, sanctions,
inspection and other methods to control self-interest
and less noble motives.
Three structural sources of public hospital resistance to
change
Each of the three structural sources of dysfunction has
its own internal metaphors, incentives and constraints.
While each source suggests a clear reform roadmap it-
self, the different approaches interfere with each other,
and no one approach covers all three sources of obstruc-
tion. Hence to date the reform roadmaps put forward
for public hospitals to deal with organizational dysfunc-
tion have been necessarily partial and insufficient.
Normal organizational stasis and dysfunction
The resistance of large scale organizations to managerial
systematization has been analyzed and debated in
organizational sociology and public administration for a
hundred years. At the turn of the 20th century, the
German sociologist Max Weber posited that all large
organizations were necessarily “legal-rational” bureau-
cracies, organized through a system of rules and offices:
“The choice is only between bureaucracy and
dilettantism in the field of administration” [41].
“Only by reversion in every field – political, religious,
economic etc. – to small-scale organization would it
be possible to any considerable extent to escape its
influence” [41].
In 1911, a mechanical engineer named Frederick
Taylor published an account of what he termed “scien-
tific management”, in which he argued that work inside
organizations could be broken down into small tasks,
measured, controlled and optimized by managers [42].
Two decades later, trying to validate Taylor’s thesis, the
Harvard sociologist Elton Mayo founded the field of
organization theory with his 1930s studies of work pro-
cesses in the Northern Electric Company’s Hawthorne
plant. Mayo discovered that the very process of measur-
ing a worker’s performance improved it – the so-called
“Hawthorne Effect” – making it possible to begin to
break down the “systematic soldiering” by which assem-
bly line workers set production rates and maintained
control over manufacturing output [43]. Subsequent
organization theorists sought to develop new strategies
to counter regular organization-wide resistance to new
managerial methods and techniques. Among other in-
sights, they proposed using salary levels to create “a zone
of indifference” within which employees would accept
direction [44]; argued that decision-makers inside orga-
nizations were restricted by “limits of rationality” to only
a few practical choices [45]; and suggested that managers
who approached workers as intelligent team members
(“Theory Y”) achieved more than those who treated their
workers as indifferent obstacles (“Theory X”) [46].
Proposals also were made to treat organizations as
cybernetic feedback-based systems [47].
Quite differently, sociologists and anthropologists
attributed organizational stasis to deeply ingrained
characteristics of the workers inside large formal orga-
nizations. The French sociologist Michel Crozier’s re-
search detailed how publicly operated organizations
become trapped in a vicious circle of underperformance
where permanent strategies generated by employee
groups to increase their own discretion provoked overly
tight and counter-productive managerial controls [48].
Geert Hofstede, a Dutch corporate anthropologist who
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did much of his research on IBM, found that efforts by
senior management to change organizational culture –
how employees did their work – slowly but inexorably
were eroded back to the original organizational norms
and values:
“Institutions may be changed, but this does not
necessarily affect the societal norms, and when these
remain unchanged, the persistent influence of a
majority value system patiently smooths the new
institutions until their structure and functioning is
again adapted to the societal norms” [49].
Taken together, these theories add up to a clear if
somewhat inchoate set of explanations for why normally
functioning organizations – including both public and
privately operated hospitals – present structural barriers
to efficient functioning and introduce seemingly inexor-
able perverse consequences.
A number of these organization theories have been
applied to explain the structural resistance to change
specifically within public hospitals. Saltman found that
physicians and nurses in Danish and Dutch public
hospitals had “permanent group strategies” that sub-
stantially constrained both managerial and political ini-
tiatives for institutional development [50, 51]. Saltman
and Bergman [52] and Saltman [4] suggested that core
Swedish societal norms and values provided both stabil-
ity and stasis regarding change in the Swedish health
care system.
Health sector/Professional stasis
Beyond the standard “normal” level of dysfunction that
organizational theorists attribute to all large organiza-
tions, specifically health care institutions contain a fur-
ther, second structural impediment to their positive
organizational development. This second source of re-
sistance to change reflects the role, authority and institu-
tional prerogatives of the health care professionals that
are the core employees within it. The inherent complex-
ity of managing health professionals – and particularly
physicians – has been studied by medical sociologists
and management strategists at least since the middle of
the last century [53–55]. The concept of a “disconnected
hierarchy” [56] has been effectively used to characterize
the difficulty of hospital managers, who lack the means to
control important positive reinforcers for physicians (eg
peer respect, publication in peer-reviewed journals) and
thus must rely on less effective, negative actions such as
threats of reduced funding or space [57]. While subse-
quent research has become more targeted, the central im-
balance in decision-making authority that particularly
physicians introduce into health care organizations gener-
ally, and hospitals in particular, remains unresolved.
On the clinical side, managers have sought to develop
strategies that harness physicians to medical teams as a
way to create better congruence between physician deci-
sions and the best interests of the hospital they work in
[58, 59]. As clinical data on individual performance has
become more available, research has sought to determine
the most effective way to improve physician performance.
However, these internal management strategies have had
relatively short half-lives, even shorter if the physician’s
medical practice and salary are not tightly tied to the
financial position of the hospital (either because the phys-
ician is in private practice on contract to a public hospital
– as is often the case in The Netherlands – or if the phys-
ician is a public employee in a permanent post and thus
insulated from most management rebuffs) [60–62]. A key
finding from research in this field is that physicians tend
to dominate hospital decision-making procedures and
constrain undesired institutional policies and practices
regardless of the national health system and culture they
operate within [50, 63–65]. Operationally, physicians
largely control the rate and pace of their workloads and
the workflow of the rest of the organization, typically
prevailing in conflicts with other staff groups [66].
As the prior paragraph suggests, the macro and micro
political power of the medical profession to exert influ-
ence is considerable and well documented. Their trusted
position in society, control over how resources are used,
their monopoly of special knowledge and other sources
of power, deference, and influence are very significant
in both creating and slowing institutional as well as
organizational change.
From the patient’s perspective, strong physician influ-
ence is often seen as a good thing: the last thing a sick
patient wants is for a clinical decision to be influenced
by or, worst of all, made by non-medically qualified
administrators or lower-level medical staff. This patient
support reinforces the particular physician-led character
of decision-making inside hospitals, and with it the
inevitable resistance to externally generated change – be
it politically or managerially led – that could interfere
with physician and, more broadly, medical staff led
decision-making.
Governance induced/Political stasis
The third area of organizational dysfunction that public
hospitals suffer from reflects the explicit political charac-
ter of policy and management decision-making in these
institutions. There is no shortage of literature that de-
scribes the non-linear, non-optimizing, and sometimes
seemingly non-rational elements that compose typical
politically structured decision-making in all sectors of
public policy (see for example [67, 68]). To suggest that
public sector decision-making is broadly dysfunctional
when viewed from the perspective of health provider
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and/or service organizations as well as of the staff work-
ing in those institutions is not novel.
Critiques of political decision-making focus on two in-
herent operational problems: legislative roadblocks and
administrative/implementation rigidities. Political scien-
tists have written at length about the problems of writ-
ing and passing effective legislation: the importance of
“policy champions” and “windows of opportunity” as
well as the always-present dangers involved in building
coalitions and evading veto-points [1]. The German
Chancellor Bismarck, somewhat less eruditely, is cred-
ited – perhaps incorrectly1 – with quipping that “those
who love sausage and the law should never watch either
being made”.
Administrative and implementation difficulties also
have received considerable scholarly attention. Drawing
on the understanding of public organizations put for-
ward by Weber [41] and Lindblom [69], among many
others, sociologists and political scientists have detailed
the procedural difficulty that public agencies have in
transforming legislated policy into effective practice.
Lipsky showed how front line staffers became “street level
bureaucrats” who de facto re-wrote official rules in welfare
service agencies so as to obtain higher benefit levels for
their clients [70]. Concepts such as “bureaucratic capture”
by outside interest groups and “bureaucratic cooptation”
through briefs and submissions from interested parties
also demonstrate the bending of administrative decision-
making to satisfy political needs. Going one step further,
Pressman and Wildavsky highlighted how hard it is to get
multiple government agencies to cooperate effectively in
the implementation of public sector projects even when
there is policy agreement among their respective agency
heads [71]. Hood suggested that adoption of private sector
tools such as contracting out were essential to overcome
these various types of politicized administration and to es-
tablish properly accountable service delivery [14]. Osborne
and Gaebler summarized these different implementa-
tion perspectives into a generalized need for public
sector governmental officials to “steer more and row
less” [15].
Further, on an operational level, administrative behav-
ior in a public civil servant environment also involves a
number of rigidities that one could delicately summarize
by the term “bureaucratic”. Staff often have legislatively
protected jobs and pensions, with little incentive to take
risks or be innovative. Efforts to sanction or dismiss
public employees, particularly when they are unionized,
are complex, elongated, expensive, and as an unsurpris-
ing consequence, rarely pursued. Whatever one might
think about the appropriateness of such job security for
postal or pension office workers, the same civil servant
status creates unique challenges in the decidedly differ-
ent working environment of emergency and inpatient
medical care services. Conversely, some public systems
also have the opposite problem. The political appointment
of hospital managers creates instability, can lead to the
promotion of under-qualified candidates and leads to
short termism and the avoidance of contentious issues.
Beyond these structural problems inherent in legisla-
tion and administration, there are a number of specific-
ally health sector dilemmas that require difficult policy
decisions which are never permanently resolved. The su-
periority of decentralized as against centralized and/or
re-centralized models of decision-making is continually
debated, with different variants of Rondinelli’s four
forms of decentralization (devolution, delegation, decon-
centration, privatization) taking turns as the favored
arrangement [72]. Present-day proposals in Norway to
centralize nationally the ownership and supervision of
all hospitals, and in England and Finland to combine
health and social services within a single administrative
structure, suggest that currently the perceived superior-
ity of centralization is seeing a revival in a number of
tax-funded European countries [73].
Political decision-makers similarly have found them-
selves boxed in by the multiple conflicting rationalities
that apply to making policy for health provider institu-
tions. Among the most prominent are:
– the conflict for resources between applying the rule
of rescue (expanding clinical and emergency
facilities) as against the need to expand population-
based equity (prevention activities and population/
geographic dispersal of core services)
– the conflict between expanding curative and primary
care coverage areas as against staying within
financial and budgetary limitations
– the conflict between ensuring long-term fiscal sus-
tainability as against getting re-elected
– the conflict between satisfying staff and/or union
demands as against satisfying patient needs.
An area of policy decision-making that never goes
away is the question of the public/private mix in ser-
vice provision. While a number of European countries
now view this issue as a pragmatic one tied to care
standards and performance [74], it is still a live polit-
ical issue [75, 76].
All these policy conflicts reduce the flexibility avail-
able to key health sector decision-makers, and lend
credence to those who prefer to “not rock the boat”
thereby favoring stability and/or stasis. Faced with
these uncomfortable and sometimes medically uncer-
tain concerns, many political actors prefer to find less
major, less threatening policy issues to tackle which
may be popular but are more peripheral and less likely
to evoke opposition.
Edwards and Saltman Israel Journal of Health Policy Research  (2017) 6:8 Page 6 of 11
Three contextual sources of public hospital resistance to
change
Each of the three contextual factors that constrain
organizational change in public hospitals reflects the
interaction of key elements in the external environment
with essential internal characteristics of mission, focus
and efficiency. While two of these factors – complexity
and anxiety – affect private as well as public hospitals,
the third, market failures, has particular impact on ef-
forts to introduce and sustain effective financial and
management incentives specifically on publicly owned
and operated institutions.
The complexity of organizing high quality, effective health
care
The extraordinary capacity of contemporary medicine to
intervene and/or restore human functioning requires high
levels of technically sophisticated and financial costly cap-
ital equipment, carefully configured physical space, and
high levels of coordination and cooperation among differ-
ent categories of medical and non-medical staff both
within and beyond hospitals walls. These institutional
requirements to deliver good medical care take great
organizational focus and managerial skill to achieve and
sustain. The continued expansion of diagnostics and treat-
ments, and the associated safety hazards, has added a
further dimension to hospital complexity.
There are also large and growing regulatory require-
ments that governments place on hospitals – extending
from normal requirements of labor law and handling dan-
gerous materials (eg radioactive waste) to specialized
concerns about care quality and patient rights [29, 77].
For large public hospitals with extensive acute care facil-
ities, all these factors add incrementally but also, taken
together, fundamentally to the major managerial challenge
of running an effective, efficient and safe institution.
Market failure in public hospitals
European health systems have struggled to define the
appropriate role of market mechanisms in hospital man-
agement for 30 years. Suggestions were initially made in
the mid-1980s that competitive public sector budgeting
could create an “internal market” [78] by transforming
public hospitals into “public firms” that could compete
with each other for patients [36], and various concepts
such as “planned markets” and “quasi-markets” [36, 37]
received considerable attention from various national
policymakers. Similarly, the development of New Public
Management thinking in the area of Public Administra-
tion reinforced the logic of applying market mechanisms
in order to better achieve public sector fiscal and
managerial outcomes [14].
National policymakers have often had difficulty finding
the balance between generating effective market pressure,
their desire for control and maintaining core public health
care obligations and responsibilities. This has been seen in
the reluctance of political decision-makers to let semi-
autonomous hospital managers retain decision-making
leeway, and the frequency with which political officials
clawed back control [21]. This is playing out again with re-
cent reassertion of central control in the United Kingdom,
Hungary and Norway. Hospital trusts, for example, have
gone through a variety of different structural formats and
configurations in England, Spain, Norway and Italy.
Efforts to develop market-sensitive managerial arrange-
ments for public hospitals based on volume-sensitive con-
tracts have often been re-designed and/or de-emphasized
due to concerns about inappropriate incentives regarding
quality and access in tax-funded systems like Stockholm
County, Sweden, and in a number of different English
trusts.
Similarly, the relatively few efforts to contract out
public hospital management to private (typically for-
profit) companies have proven contentious, with little
agreement as to whether outcomes have been improved
in such examples as Alzira in Valencia, Spain and Sct
Gorans in Stockholm, Sweden [79, 80]. This overall diffi-
culty of fit has further inflamed broader policy disputes
over the appropriateness of market mechanisms – or new
public management strategies such as contracting out to
private sector entities for specific services – having any
role in public hospital management [76, 81].
One particular dilemma is that the cost structure of
hospitals and the interconnectedness of services makes
the reduction of costs when income is lost very challen-
ging. This means that the preferred strategy for hospital
managers is to grow the organization and to compensate
for a loss of income from one source with increased
volumes from existing payers or new work from other
payers rather than reducing costs. This, combined with
the reluctance of politicians to let public hospitals go
bankrupt, creates a further market failure.
Although patient organizations have recently become
more vocal inside countries and across the European
Union, demanding a greater role in political and policy
decisions that affect patient outcomes [3], the voice of
the consumer in many public hospital systems is rela-
tively weak and there is not always choice of provider
further limiting the effectiveness of market mechanisms.
Generalized and specific anxiety
The reasons for patients to be anxious are obvious and real,
and need not be recounted here. Staff experience anxiety as
well from the emotional and physical labor involved in car-
ing, in breaking bad news, making difficult decisions and
having a large number of opportunities to make errors
which may result in death or disability [82, 83]. Patients
and clinicians are confronted with existential issues that
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have challenging psychological resonances. Clinical detach-
ment and other coping strategies are often of limited effect-
iveness and can compound the problem. Exhortations to be
compassionate may make the problem still worse. This
tends to be compounded by an environment that is hier-
archical and quick to attribute blame: these may in fact be
defenses against anxiety but they often have the paradoxical
effect of increasing it [83, 84].
Managers have the anxiety that comes from the
limited control that they can wield in a professional
organization, often combined with high levels of external
pressure to perform and a political context that tends to
denigrate their role and limit their scope of action. In
turn, politicians are frequently in the same position and
are held accountable for a system they cannot control
and which they will not be associated with for long
enough to change. The fact that they may not even have
formal responsibility for the way that care is delivered is
not a protection from blame. The experience of trying to
reform health systems and the subsequent career trajec-
tories of those that do suggests that their anxiety may be
justified. Both political and managerial anxiety seep into
the clinical system as attempts are made to create assur-
ance and exercise control.
Unresolved anxiety in organizations can lead to a
range of dysfunctional behaviors including bullying,
depersonalisation, ritualized behavior, techniques for
blame shifting or diffusion, approaches that reduce the
chance to learn from failures and – crucially for this
paper – resistance to change.
Summing the public hospital quandary
Taken together, the three structural plus the three context-
ual factors described above steer public hospital decision-
making toward both organizational and institutional resist-
ance to change. The fundamental structural bias is toward
not doing rather than doing, toward not implementing
rather than implementing, and toward minor rather than
innovative and systematic change. Moreover, while the
effect of these six constraints varies across countries, across
governments, and also within different areas of countries,
the overall consequences are apparent quite widely. Simply
put, the process of organizational change in public hospitals
faces a highly resistant institutional environment, captured
by the formulation in Fig. 1.
Public Hospital Decision Environment:
 Normal Organizational Dysfunction, plus






This set of structural and contextual factors breaks out
the core organizational constraints that confront decisions
about change in public hospitals. These six dimensions
delimit the de facto boundaries, lay down the practical
parameters that both policymaking and management
needs somehow to accommodate. Every proposal to alter
institutional behavior, every new mechanism to improve
quality and safety, to introduce more efficient financial
programs, to alter daily staff service routines, even to
change contracting partners for auxiliary services such as
laundry or cleaning, all necessarily gets filtered through
this six-way sieve before the outcome actually emerges at
clinic or organization level.
This complicated and complicating mix of factors simul-
taneously generates the need, on the one hand, for con-
tinuous institutional development and change, and, on the
other hand, reinforces the multiple organizational, profes-
sional, political and behavioral forces pushing for stability
and/or stasis in day-to-day organizational operations and
procedures.
As with all change, understanding behavior and motiv-
ation are important. This framework needs to be in-
formed by a richer and more nuanced view of this than
is the case in some of ideas that have underpinned pol-
icymaking. The framework does not solve the problem
of how to get complex groups of individuals aligned
behind change objectives, it can help understand some
of the issues that make this difficult.
Conclusions
Taken overall, the above framework of structural limitations
and contextual factors can help health sector analysts better
understand how public hospital decision-making actually
takes place. Specifically, the 3 + 3 framework outlined in
Fig. 1 can serve as an intellectual sieve through which to
test the feasibility of potential reform ideas. By exploring
how well a possible policy or management strategy might
work in dealing with dilemmas raised in each of the
Fig. 1 The 3 + 3 decision framework
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framework’s six separate dimensions, analysts potentially
can adjust or re-frame one or more elements of a particular
approach, seeking to ensure that it would improve, or at
least not make worse, an existing element of the overall
public hospital decision-making equation. This approach
would allow new reform strategies to in effect be “stress-
tested” across the six different dimensions that define the
public hospital decision environment. Moreover, policy and
regulatory initiatives can be assessed for their explicitly
managerial impacts. This modelling of different likely insti-
tutional, organizational, and contextual responses can likely
reduce practical and/or operational difficulties within one
or more of the six different decision-related factors prior to
a new strategy being introduced into practice.
Building out a set of useful and implementable re-
sponses to this analysis will require a carefully choreo-
graphed mix of regulatory and managerial activities,
particularly in the current difficult environment for public
hospitals generally [85]. As Dixon-Woods [86] noted earl-
ier of quality programs, there is a danger that too much
technical complexity can overwhelm the ability to success-
fully implement reforms in practice that on paper had
appeared to be effective interventions. Dixon-Woods’ anti-
dote of practical wisdom and small politics, the notion of
“humble inquiry” at the center of Edgar Schein’s recent
work [87], and also the strategy at successful medical
centers like Virginia Mason whose Chief Executive Offi-
cer has called for “authentic relationships built on trust
and respect” offers some answers.2 There may be little
alternative to hard work, the use of data, attention to
detail, the deployment of a method and a clear vision
set from above [88].
The 3 + 3 framework can be of particular value to
national ministries of health, where the importance of
gaming out the inter-relationships between political and/
or regulatory initiatives on the one hand, and likely man-
agerial responses at the organizational level on the other,
is paramount to the long-term success of health sector
reform initiatives. Fine-tuning new programs and strat-
egies to accommodate the 3 + 3 framework also could
help achieve broader national priorities of which more
effective management of public hospitals forms an im-
portant component.
It is important to note that effective design principles
necessarily start from the premise that the organizational
problems created by the three dominant dimensions of
dysfunctionality, as well as the behavioral problem of
generalized anxiety, cannot be solved by clever new pol-
icy proposals devised at the political level. They will only
yield – and only to some extent – to re-thinking how to
engage the people inside the organization who receive
operational directives, and the structural environment
and practical management realities on the ground that
determine how they respond to those directives.
It also is important to recognize that the 3 + 3 frame-
work is not a formula for discovering what organizational
theorists sometimes derisively refer to as “magic bullets”.
Instead it is a call to apply the basic core lessons of trad-
itional hands-on, shop-floor-level management. Among
other elements, this approach will mean accepting differ-
ent management styles and approaches in different insti-
tutions, indeed in different parts of the same institution.
Operational flexibility, not centralized standardization,
will need to become the policy watchword. Import-
antly, the political role in public hospitals will need
to fade further, while the managerial role will neces-
sarily grow in prominence.
How such an approach could be conceived, designed,
implemented and sustained in day-to-day real-world
practice raises a raft of difficult questions. A wide-
ranging discussion among all key constituencies will be
necessary to begin to detail the complex process of
change that will be required.
Endnotes
1The Daily Cleveland Herald, March 29, 1869, quoted
lawyer-poet John Godfrey Saxe as saying that, “Laws, like
sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we
know how they are made”, and this may be the true
origin of the saying.
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